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The question of what happens to us after we die is one of the most important that 
philosophers can address, as well as being one of the most vexed. The answer Stephen T. 
Davis gives over the course of After We Die may be summarized as follows: human beings 
consist of a soul and a body, and after death the soul exists for a time in a disembodied state; 
at the general resurrection it is reunited with a body (not necessarily made of the same matter 
as before, but of matter that is organized as before), which is then transformed into a glorified 
body that, while possessing different properties from the flesh and blood body, is 
nevertheless still physical. Depending on their individual merits, resurrected human beings 
will end up in one of two final afterlife destinations, heaven or hell, without any detour 
through purgatory required for those destined to heaven. 
 This is, of course, a straightforwardly Christian eschatology, and given that this is 
what Davis is minded to outline and defend in After We Die, and that he describes the book as 
“a Christian book, an exercise in Christian philosophical theology” (5), it is rather surprising 
to find that the second chapter is devoted to an examination of the relative merits of two 
different systems of salvation, Karma and Grace. Given that Karma is not really a live option 
for Christians, being grounded in neither scripture nor tradition, it is not clear why it needed 
to be considered at all. But if it had to be, then since Davis later declines to endorse the 
doctrine of purgatory on the grounds that it has no scriptural basis (110), it seems to me that 
he could have dispensed with Karma on the same grounds. Instead, he takes the more 
circuitous route of pitting Karma and Grace against each other, first considering a number of 
objections to Grace (36-38), which are later answered (42-46), and a number of objections to 
Karma (38-42), which are not. This leads Davis to the conclusion that “Grace should be 
preferred to Karma ... because, as I have argued, Karma is subject to telling objections, while 
Grace is not” (47), though my suspicion is that a proponent of Karma would not consider the 
objections raised against it here to be as telling as Davis supposes. For example, his fourth 
objection holds that, under Karma, it is difficult to see the connection between me and my 
future “karmic heir,” that is, the future version of me whose station in life will be decided by 
how I live in this one. While Davis accepts that my karmic heir would have the same soul as I 
do, he insists that this does not resolve the epistemological problem of “why I should believe 
that my karmic heir is me” (41) since there will be no similarities in body or, more 
importantly, memory. As far as I can tell, the problem here seems to emerge from supposing 
that individuality and memory really matter, a Western viewed not shared by Eastern 
religions which typically see individuality as illusory and memories as insignificant. Thus a 
proponent of Karma would probably not consider Davis’ objection to be a problem at all. 
 As one would expect, Davis’ analysis is more solid when focusing on specifically 
Christian doctrines. The chapters on resurrection, hell, purgatory, and heaven form the heart 
of the book, and from these chapters emerges Davis’ defense of the position outlined above. 
The most impressive feature of this defense is the way that Davis utilizes both scripture and 
philosophical argument to support his position while steering clear of dogmatism (he often 
notes that alternative positions are possible and indicates arguments in their favor). While 
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there is much here to engage with and comment on, I shall restrict myself to a few remarks 
about his views on heaven and hell. 
 With regard to the latter, Davis modifies the traditional view to make hell not only 
consistent with God’s loving and gracious nature but also entailed by it. Eschewing the 
normal characterization of hell as a place of fiery torment, Davis claims that it is “a place of 
separation from God” (94), populated by those who have rejected him, which means that in a 
very real sense the denizens of hell have chosen to be there and so are not unwilling victims 
of divine retribution (95). Consistent with this, Davis suggests that the suffering of the 
damned is largely self-inflicted (e.g. extreme remorse) or inflicted by other denizens of hell 
(95), rather than the result of any torment imposed by God. Lastly, Davis argues that because 
those in hell have chosen to be there and want to be there, God’s decision to put them there—
even for the rest of eternity—is simultaneously an expression of his love and justice (96), and 
thus the existence of hell does not detract from either. This mitigated or humane conception 
of hell, as we might call it, neatly undercuts the oft-made ethical objection that an eternal hell 
is not consistent with God’s perfect goodness. As such, those not attracted to universalism 
may find Davis’ mitigated conception of hell worthy of consideration. 
 As for the doctrine of heaven, after outlining what scripture has to say about it (118-
119), Davis considers a number of potential problems with the doctrine, one of which is: how 
can those in heaven be happy knowing that others are suffering in hell? There are two parts to 
Davis’ response. First he suggests that “Doubtless the blessed can derive some moral 
satisfaction from seeing that justice has been done and from seeing that God has honored the 
will of the reprobates themselves in their choice of hell” (120), a less morally objectionable 
thought than the old “abominable fancy,” which holds that the blessed are said to derive 
pleasure—rather than just moral satisfaction—from seeing the damned suffer. Second, Davis 
suggests the blessed will experience “some sort of partial memory loss” of the reprobate in 
hell, perhaps brought on by being in God’s presence, which “will be so overwhelming that no 
worries, sorrows, or pains from the past can possibly intrude” (120). The two suggestions 
look to me to be in tension (after all, the blessed cannot derive satisfaction from seeing that 
the reprobate have been justly treated if they have forgotten about the reprobate), and I am 
unsure how the tension could be resolved. Of the two suggestions, the second (partial 
memory loss) strikes me as the most promising, though I worry that it sits uneasily with Luke 
16.19-26, in which Abraham (in heaven) is not only able to see a rich man (in hell) but also 
communicate with him, which might suggest that those in heaven do not forget about those in 
hell at all. 
 Of course, in such difficult matters one should not expect definitive or unproblematic 
answers, and to be fair Davis typically does not present his own answers as definitive or 
unproblematic, but as what he considers most reasonable given the scriptural and 
philosophical data available. His humility does not in any way prevent After We Die being a 
very effective and well-argued personal vision of the afterlife, and on that basis the book is 
easy to recommend to students of theology and philosophy of religion. 
